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From Perception to Subject: The Bergsonian Reversal 
What singles out philosophical analyses of perception is the challenge to 
common sense, that is, to the spontaneous, instinctive belief that an external 
world exists and that it is similar to the perception we have of it. Even those 
theories that refrain from questioning the independent existence of the 
world concede that the resemblance of whatever is out there to the perceived 
reality is anything but assured. Henri Bergson proposes a theory of 
perception that not only restores the common belief in the existence of an 
external world, but also goes a long way in narrowing the alleged disparity 
between perception and the objective world. With few exceptions, Bergson’s 
theory of perception has been either ignored or misunderstood. Through a 
close reading of the first chapter of Matter and Memory, the paper argues, in 
addition to correcting misreadings, that the strength and originality of 
Bergson’s theory lie in the reversal of the method of explaining perception 
from the premise of a given subject, a premise shared by all idealist and 
realist theories as well as phenomenology. This de-subjectification proposes 
an approach deriving perception from the interactions of objects while 
countering the materialist theory of the brain as an organ of representation. 
The paper contends that the Bergsonian elucidation of the brain as an organ 
of simulation both anticipates the findings of the sensorimotor theory and 
overcomes its limitation by showing how simulation inserts indetermination 
into materiality, thereby actualizing consciousness.    
 
Contradictions of Representational Theories of Perception 
The perception of objects presents the characteristics of being external, 
extended, and qualitatively differentiated. At the same time, it is equally 
true that external objects are just a set of ideas in the mind of the perceiver. 
From the inescapable fact that the mind knows only its own ideas, the 
M e s s a y  K e b e d e  |  1 0 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 1 (2014)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.645 
idealist thinker draws the conclusion that the path of consistency is to 
maintain that the world is nothing but my own representation. George 
Berkeley, an authoritative proponent of the idealist position, finds the belief 
that objects exist independently of the perceptions that we have of them 
contradictory. He asks: “What are the fore-mentioned objects but the things 
we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or 
sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any 
combination of them, should exist unperceived?”1 
Consistency does not shield the idealist position from being utterly 
untenable. True, the idealist assumption explains why perception is a 
centered system in which things vary according to the movements of the 
perceiving subject. All the same, the explanation cannot deny that, though 
the subject occupies the center, the things that surround it are governed by 
laws independent of the will of the perceiver. This recognition forces the 
idealist “to abandon this central position, to replace all the images on the 
same plane, to suppose that they no longer vary for him, but for 
themselves.”2 Some such admission turns idealism into realism, that is, into 
a defense of the belief that reality exists independently of the perceiver. But 
given that idealists cannot have recourse to the concept of matter to establish 
the independence of perceived objects, they have to appeal to some deus ex 
machina. Thus, to explain the permanence and regularity of his perceptions, 
Berkeley could find no other solution than to pinpoint God as the direct 
cause of his ideas and His benevolence as the reason for their ordered 
course.  
Though unlike idealists, realists admit the independent existence of 
things, their theory of perception is no less contradictory. Since realists are 
convinced that perception is representation, they feel compelled to clearly 
separate the subjective from the objective, that is, what appears in the mind 
from what is external to the mind. This way of positing the problem contains 
the quagmire in which realists find themselves. Since for them the real is the 
world where things are governed by objective laws, the centered and 
variable system of perception cannot be anything other than appearance. On 
the other hand, realists concede that only the world of perception is given so 
that the real world, the world behind our perceptions is either posited by 
means of arbitrary “metaphysical construction” or is declared 
“unknowable” in the fashion of Kant or Hume.3 An instance of metaphysical 
construction is Descartes’s argument that perceptions, despite their 
subjective nature and provided they are distinct and clear, can be said to 
correspond to material objects on account of God being not “a deceiver.”4 
What is more, the purification of perception from all that is exclusively 
subjective results in the reduction of material objects to pure extension, 
which reduction has little to do with the qualitative nature of my perception.   
It must not be made to seem that the materialist version of realism is in 
a better shape in its dealing with the existence of a material world. Insofar as 
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the materialist credo reduces the real to materiality, its theory of perception 
entirely rests on a substitution: what for dualists is the distinct function of a 
spiritual agent is passed on to the brain––a material object among other 
material objects––which is then endowed with the occult and unknowable 
power of “engendering representations.”5 Moreover, because it is said that, 
instead of the mind, the brain produces the representation of objects, the 
problem is nowhere near to being solved: perception still remains drowned 
in subjectivism and the materialist ends up, just as the idealist, with the 
affirmation that the world is nothing but his/her representation. 
The major contradiction of dualistic and materialist representational 
theories of perception is that their conclusion leans toward the idealist 
standpoint despite their initial rejection of it. As to idealism, it refuses the 
point of departure of realism but only to move toward it as soon as it wants 
to explain why perceived things are independent of the will of the perceiver. 
The source of these contradictions is to be found in the stubborn idea of 
lodging perception in the subject, be it in the brain or in the mind, thereby 
locking up perception in an insurmountable subjectivism. The consequence 
is that the existence of an independent world and the confidence that things 
look like the perceptions we have of them turn into intractable problems. In 
truth, the predicaments of representational theories should not come as a 
surprise: the idea of engendering the representation of the external world, 
not from the world itself but from the brain or the mind of the perceiver, 
seriously muddles the notion of externality from the get-go. If the 
representation of an object is in the brain or the mind, then the externality of 
the object can be established only by unconvincing intellectual artifices. 
 
The Two Systems and the Practical Function of Perception 
Since the contradictions of realist and idealist theories of perception show 
that the attempt to deduce the objective system of matter from the centered 
system of perception or vice versa is at an impasse, Bergson invites us to 
admit that “each of them is sufficient to itself.”6 So posited, the problem of 
perception is no longer how internal representations reproduce the objective 
world. Rather, it is to explain how the same objects can belong to two 
different systems: (1) the objective system where things are given as external 
to one another and are governed by objective laws, thereby forming an 
independent world; (2) the system of perception in which the same objects 
exist for and vary according to the perceiving subject.   
The same objects can belong to two different systems only if the 
centered system, instead of being a copy, a transmutation of the material 
into a mental duplicate (realism) or an absolute excluding the unperceived 
(idealism), is just a limitation of the uncentered and objective system. Such 
an approach does no more than drop all representational theories of 
perception in favor of a theory attributing the system of perception to a 
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selective act. The immediate implication of this theory is that there is no 
difference in kind between perceived things and things in themselves. While 
all representational theories cannot avoid opposing appearance to reality, 
for Bergson, perceived things are not subjective entities, but selected things, 
that is, things turned toward us instead of being turned toward each other. 
The difference between perception and reality is not one of appearance 
versus reality, but simply one of part and whole.  
What could be the function of the centered system as opposed to the 
uncentered system?  When we contrast the system of matter in which objects 
act and react in a necessary way with the centered system of perception in 
which things vary in relation to a central object, both the variation and the 
selected nature of the centered system suggest that its purpose is to allow 
actions emanating from the center. In the system of matter, to the extent that 
actions and reactions are automatic, a centered system is utterly superfluous 
owing to the absence of autonomous reactions. The appearance of a centered 
and selected system presupposes, therefore, the withholding of automatism 
in favor of objects displaying themselves for an autonomous agent.  
The definition of perception as selection brings about a crucial change of 
perspective. All idealist and representational theories work with the 
assumption that perception induces a speculative attitude toward objects. As 
Bergson puts it, their common postulate is that “perception has a wholly 
speculative interest; it is pure knowledge.”7 Indeed, when idealists and realists 
conceive of perception as a subjective picture, is it not to endow it with a 
cognitive function? Other than providing knowledge about external objects, 
of what use would mental duplicates be? The only difference is that realists 
consider perception as confused knowledge, as opposed to science, which 
studies things as they are, and not as they appear, while idealists see 
perception as an authentic revelation of what is given and science as a mere 
symbolic or useful expression.  
In contrast to the traditional assumption–with the notable exception of 
the pragmatist school, which, like Bergson, maintains that perception must 
be understood in terms of action–to approach perception from the 
perspective of selection involves action and action alone. Perception serves 
action only if it adjusts the world to the practical needs of an active agent. In 
order to do so, perception must be part of things rather than being a 
speculative view, taking place in the subjective realm of the perceiver. In 
effect, as the act of selecting, perception reveals what interests our action and 
leaves out what is of no interest. It does so, not by a process of knowledge 
reproducing subjectively the environment, but by displaying what is of 
interest while the rest remains in the dark or is unperceived. In other words, 
perception is not so much representation as presence or manifestation. 
Granted, both the French text of Bergson’s Matter and Memory and its 
English translation use the term “representation,” but it must be understood 
as presence, revelation, and not as mental duplicate. The “re” in 
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representation means what comes out subsequent to a sorting out, as will be 
elaborated in the following pages.  
The confusion between perception and knowledge, between presence 
and representation (in the sense of duplication) comes from the fact that 
higher intellectual faculties and, notably, memory always fuse with the raw 
material of perception. By inserting past images into the present, memory 
incorporates recognition into perception, and so converts presence into 
representation. The mixture induces the wrong belief that perception takes 
place inside us instead of being inside things. In short, memory subjectivizes 
perception and explains the transition from what Bergson calls “pure 
perception” to “concrete perception.” As one scholar writes, “the true 
subjective consciousness belongs solely to memory for Bergson. Only with 
the injection of memories of the past in the apprehension of a present object 
does the perception become a properly mental event with a subjective and 
individual hue.”8 More will be said about the role of memory in the last 
paragraph.  
 
Matter and Perception 
That the selective nature of perception guarantees the reality of what is 
perceived entails that the characteristics of perception are attributable to 
matter. And since the consensus is that material objects are perceived as 
images, the logical conclusion is that matter itself is just an ensemble of 
images. To quote Bergson, “I call matter the aggregate of images, and perception 
of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, 
my body.”9  
Both idealism and realism admit that material objects are given as 
images, to wit, as picturesque representations defined by size, shape, 
position, colors, sounds, etc. Disagreements arise, not on the fact that things 
appear as images, but on the question whether images exhaust the reality of 
what is perceived (idealism) or are mental duplications of something 
different (realism). What we have said so far establishes against realism and 
idealism that reality is neither duplicated nor reduced to the perceiving 
mind. To say so is to reject both the separation between appearance and 
reality and the shrinkage of reality to the perceived; it is to ascertain that the 
perceived and the object are one and the same, and hence that the object in 
itself is an objectively existing image. For Bergson, this is exactly how 
common sense conceives of material objects: “the object exists in itself, and, 
on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it 
is, but a self-existing image.”10  
Berkeley, too, is of the opinion that his theory of perception agrees with 
common sense, with the idea that things are exactly how we perceive them. 
However, Berkeley departs from common sense when he concludes that “to 
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be is to be perceived.” For common sense, not only things are exactly how 
we perceive them, but they also remain so even when we do not perceive 
them. Things exist as unperceived images, a view Bergson endorses by 
saying that “an image may be without being perceived; it may be present 
without being represented.”11  
Bergson’s definition of matter as an ensemble of images suggests an 
affinity, a lineage between materiality and consciousness. It affirms that 
perceived and unperceived material objects are essentially of the same 
nature, the perceived being simply a cut from the whole. Specifically, to 
extend the characteristics of perception to material objects means that no less 
than the so-called primary qualities (extension, figure, movement, and 
solidity), secondary qualities (color, sound, smell, taste) belong to matter. 
The conception does away with traditional dualism according to which “in 
consciousness there would only be images—these were qualitative and 
without extension. In space there would only be movements—these were 
extended and quantitative.”12 In testifying that matter is qualitatively 
differentiated, perception extends the indivisibility of consciousness to 
matter as well, so that what appears divisible, distinct, and juxtaposed to 
other objects is just a piece cut out from the fundamental “continuity of the 
extended.”13 If to perceive is to put a portion into relief, then the portion 
belongs to a whole that it is both continuous and differentiated.  
The affinity between matter and what is perceived, the conception, 
therefore, that “things are of the same nature as perception” retains the 
strengths of realism and idealism while avoiding their mistakes.14 It says 
that realism is right in positing an objective world, an independent reality, 
but wrong when it equates independence with being alien to consciousness. 
On the other hand, the affinity with consciousness rescues the idealist belief 
that the perceived is not a copy of reality, without however confining reality 
to the perceiving mind.  
According to the traditional approach, conscious perception reveals 
what basically is incapable of revealing itself. In conceiving things as images, 
Bergson rejects the assumed opacity of matter. That is why, unlike Berkeley, 
an image does not need a subject to exist on its own. Materiality is 
appearance that does not require a subject, for otherwise unperceived things 
would not exist as images. Since each image receives the influence of all 
other images and reacts, it is by definition manifestation, appearance. An 
image is not a self-contained entity, a substance; it is strictly identical to the 
actions it receives and to the reactions it opposes In a word, it is “merely a 
road by which pass, in every direction, the modifications propagated 
throughout the immensity of the universe.”15 As a product of action and 
reaction, an image is a phenomenon; its essence is to manifest, shine. The 
condition for objects to look like the perceptions we have of them is that 
their existence is their manifestation, and not their being entities, which 
would exist without appearing. Since in the system of necessity everything 
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exists owing to interaction, being image is an intrinsic property of 
materiality.  
To elaborate further, the definition of things as images implies that 
things themselves have the being of perception. To say otherwise would be 
to reintroduce the distinction between being and appearance. How could 
there be identity between the image and the image perceived unless the 
nature of the image agrees with that of perception? We saw that being 
nothing more than the sum of the influences that it receives and the 
reactions that it opposes, an image exists, not a self-contained entity, but as 
manifestation, appearance. An object does not transit from the status of non-
image to that of appearance by an external device. To appear is exactly its 
existence or the way it exists. When a thing owes its being to action and 
reaction, its existence cannot be that of a substance, of something closing, 
withdrawing within itself. Since its existence depends on action and 
reaction, it has the being of appearance. To use an analogy, an image exists 
in the same way as the location of intersecting beams of light appears. If 
materiality is defined by action and reaction, nothing in it possesses the 
character of being self-contained or of “being-in-itself,” to borrow the 
language of phenomenology. In other words, Bergson throws out the whole 
tradition of identifying materiality with being-in-itself: a material object is 
not an independent, self-contained existence; rather, its existence is 
relational, and as such it exists as appearance or image. The fact that the 
object exists as appearance, and not as a substance, establishes that it has the 
same status as perception, which, everybody agrees, is just appearance. The 
way the object appears to perception is exactly how it comes into being. 
Consequently, the question is no longer why things appear, but under what 
conditions appearance turns into a conscious perception. 
Bergson reminds us that the choice is never between defining matter in 
terms of image or not. In whichever way the definition is devised, it must 
involve something that it is perceivable. No matter the defining element 
(atom, force, wave, energy, light, etc.), it must be “determined in relation to 
an eventual vision and an eventual contact.”16 The inevitability of the 
determination of matter by something perceivable is how it is conceived in 
terms of image, which conception presupposes a kinship between matter 
and consciousness. One cannot defend the veracity of the definition without 
at the same time assuming the objectivity of what is perceived as image.  
The approach conceding the latency of consciousness in matter escapes 
the impossible task of deducing consciousness from what is absolutely 
devoid of consciousness. The rejection that things are images in themselves 
only leads to the impasse that images have just a subjective existence. 
Nothing is then left but the theory of the brain producing consciousness, 
which as we saw is a magical explanation. It is indeed magic to believe that a 
thing previously defined as totally stranger to consciousness could 
somehow produce it. As to dualism, it does not offer a better alternative: the 
M e s s a y  K e b e d e  |  1 0 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 1 (2014)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.645 
idea of placing images in the mind entails the subjectivity of images, and 
hence an unbridgeable gap between matter and perception. For Bergson, 
only the definition of matter as an aggregate of images can put to rest both 
the materialist project of deducing consciousness from that which by 
definition is alien to it and the dualist attempt to unite completely 
antithetical substances. As Jean-Paul Sartre puts it, according to Bergson, 
“there is no need to derive consciousness…since to posit the material world 
is to have a collection of images.”17  
The question of how Bergson accounts for perception without positing 
an a priori subject points to the insertion of choice into determinism. The 
operation invites the understanding of the conversion of images into 
possible actions as a manifestation of impersonal consciousness. What 
follows must therefore elucidate successively the following issues: first, the 
notion of impersonal consciousness; second, the mechanism of selection and 
presentation of images; third, the process by which the impersonal becomes 
the perception of a distinct subject.   
 
The Idea of Impersonal Consciousness 
The theory that things are images and that they are perceived where they are 
and as they are, while it definitely overcomes the difficulties of dualism by 
positing an affinity between matter and consciousness, raises the huge 
problem of the distinction between the perceived and the perceiving subject. 
The problem is the very one that Sartre throws at Bergson when he asks, 
“how this unconscious, impersonal consciousness becomes the conscious 
consciousness of an individual subject. How do virtually represented images 
suddenly manage to encompass an ‘I’ by becoming present?”18 For Sartre, 
the identification of matter with images, insofar as it conflates being with 
consciousness and compels us to speak of unconscious, impersonal 
consciousness, is a theoretical deadlock. It overlooks that the fundamental 
character of consciousness is to be transparent to itself, as opposed to the 
absolute opacity of objects: because it is always consciousness of something, 
it can never be an object for itself.   
The riddle here is that Bergson and phenomenology agree on the 
substantial issue, namely, that perception excludes having images in the 
mind so that things are perceived outside, where they are. In agreement 
with Bergson’s analysis, Sartre’s intentional consciousness transcends itself 
and reveals objects directly, without the mediation of internal images.19 
Moreover, intentionality, the act of aiming at something objective upholds 
the Bergsonian idea of perception as selection or extraction from a much 
vaster field of objects. Nonetheless, the agreement is obtained through 
irreconcilable means: for Bergson, the externality of the perceived derives, 
not from the intentionality of consciousness, but from the objective 
interactions of images. What this means is that, though phenomenology 
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constitutes a radical departure from the traditional position, Bergson’s 
rupture with tradition is even more radical. 
For Bergson, the distinction between subject and object cannot be posed 
in terms of opposition, as is still the case with the Sartrean dualism of being 
and nothingness, because matter and consciousness are not alien entities. 
Accordingly, what makes things perceivable is no longer the subject, but the 
very characteristic of things. Rather than things becoming perceivable as a 
result of the action of an external subject, they offer themselves as 
perceivable. What we have said so far about images entails that things let 
themselves be perceived, that their being images implies the intrinsic 
property that they exist inasmuch as they reveal themselves. The passage 
from appearance to presence, that is, to being consciously perceived, adds 
nothing to images. As we shall see soon, it simply results from an alteration 
in the way images interact.   
Granted that the fact of consciousness of being always consciousness of 
something clearly separates subject and object, the fact remains that 
intentionality does not eliminate the subjectivity of perception. What defeats 
the elimination is the separation of consciousness and the object it aims at: 
intentionality is how consciousness is always outside of itself, but it is also 
how it never coincides with the object. For Bergson, by contrast, as forcefully 
implied in the characterization of material objects as images, there is 
“coincidence” between consciousness and the object perceived.20 It is just 
that there is no way of avoiding subjectivism if conscious perception is the 
act of a subject instead of being an outcome of the interactions of images.  
 For perception to be indeed an objective revelation, that is, for things 
to be perceived as they are and where they are, there is only one condition: 
perception must occur in things themselves rather than consciousness 
revealing things. Gilles Deleuze demarcates phenomenology from 
Bergsonism by opposing the expression “all consciousness is something,” 
which would be proper to Bergson, to the phenomenological formula of “all 
consciousness is consciousness of something.”21 The latter maintains a 
distinction between the perceiver and the perceived; that of Bergson erases 
the distinction. Consciousness is not aiming at; it is the thing itself, more 
exactly, the thing revealed. Clearly, Bergson’s position breaks with the 
whole philosophical tradition according the sole function of revealing, of 
drawing things out of their ontological darkness, like a flashlight illuminates 
objects in a dark room, to the conscious subject. For Bergson, the reverse is 
true: “consciousness is a luminosity which goes from the thing to the 
subject,” says Sartre.22 In fact, Sartre’s comment falls short of exactitude by 
implicating a subject: the process is best rendered “by analogy as self-
perception of matter.”23   
The sticking point between Bergson, phenomenologists, and dualists, is 
the issue whether consciousness exists only as subject. The reduction of 
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consciousness to cogito totally rejects the idea of impersonal consciousness. 
Yet, if we ask the question of knowing which of the two positions relies on 
the least postulates, the answer is obvious. Bergson’s critics start with self-
consciousness, which they take for granted, whereas Bergson wants to 
derive it from an impersonal function. Far from being a given, the 
personalized consciousness is an outcome of a process involving the 
centered activity of the body and the continuity of memory. The theory that 
attempts the genesis of the subject from materiality itself is more likely to 
avoid the predicaments of dualism.  
More importantly, the positing of impersonal consciousness alone 
guarantees the objectivity of perception. To consider self-consciousness as 
the only and exclusive form of consciousness is to insert between the object 
and perception the unbridgeable gap separating that which is conscious 
from that which is devoid of consciousness. Defending phenomenology, 
Renaud Barbaras sees a contradiction between Bergson’s definition of matter 
as an ensemble of images and his attempt to deduce subjectivity. The 
definition, he says, presupposes a subject, obvious as it is that one cannot 
speak of image “without a subject that conditions it.”24 Precisely, if the 
image, instead of being an image in itself, is conditioned by the subject, the 
image and the thing no longer coincide and the objectivity of perception is 
lost for good. The only way by which perception can be clear of subjectivism 
is through the assumption that self-consciousness emerges from a more 
primitive form of consciousness inherent in materiality itself. In a nutshell, 
Bergson and phenomenology agree that things are perceived where they are; 
however, Bergson adds that they are also perceived as they are because they 
are images.  
 What the identity between object and perception underlines is the 
system of action, the practical connection of the living body with the 
environment. As we saw, the system is prior to knowledge, that is, to the 
distinction between subject and object. In the practical system, the 
environment and the living body, which occupies the center, constitute a 
circuit, and so belong to the same conscious system. We do not have here a 
one-sided process where a conscious subject unilaterally aims at objects, but 
a system that is both centered and an encompassing whole of interacting 
images, the only difference from the system of matter being that the 
necessity of action and reaction is converted into the possible actions of a 
central image. Bergson finds that experience confirms the impersonal nature 
of perception: “psychologists,” he says, “who have studied infancy are well 
aware that our representation is at first impersonal. Only little by little, and 
as a result of experience, does it adopt our body as a centre and become our 
representation.”25 Without overlooking important differences, the role that 
Bergson attributes to experience and memory in the formation of the self 
comes close to the position of an empiricist like John Locke, who bases 
personal identity on “the same continued consciousness.”26 The Bergsonian 
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idea of a genesis of the self from impersonal consciousness should not be 
harder to accept than the empiricist assumption of a tabula rasa mind, whose 
lack of content signifies an initial impersonal mind.  
Before dealing with the process of conscious perception, we must settle 
one issue, to wit, whether placing perception in things themselves does not 
amount to a form of animism. Maurice Merleau-Ponty alludes to those 
critics who accused Bergson of being “an animist,” because “his universe of 
images was an ensemble of representations without a subject, and that he 
gave himself a diffuse consciousness floating in the things.”27 The accusation 
seems to stem from an inability to understand the originality of Bergson’s 
theory in that it overlooks some points that are both glaring and 
fundamental. First of all, perception implies, as already stated, a circuit so 
that the conscious dimension is confined neither to the perceiver nor to the 
perceived; it simply reveals their dynamic relation. Second, the images that 
protrude as distinct objects have no real existence, since they are artificial 
cuts for the purpose of action in the moving continuity. Accordingly, as 
already stated, individualized objects are not entities or do not have a 
distinct existence, let alone having souls. What is real is the continuity of 
matter in which consciousness inheres as a neutralized property actualized 
only by the living body. Third, Bergson wants to overcome the difficulties of 
dualism by avoiding the conception of consciousness as something opposed 
and external to matter in favor of an approach that shows spirit growing out 
from materiality through a process of differentiation. Rather than sticking to 
the impasse of an original opposition, differentiation starts with a primitive 
unity and explains the emergence and autonomy of spirit by the activation 
of qualitative differences.  
 
The Role of the Brain 
The impersonal or objective nature of perception is what Bergson calls “pure 
perception,” which he defines as “the lowest degree of mind––mind without 
memory––” and adds that it “is really part of matter.”28 On the other hand, 
we have already established that to perceive is not to form an image in the 
mind but to select by leaving out what is of no interest to the living body. 
What remains to be explained is how the act of selecting can result in a 
conscious phenomenon, understood as impersonal and objective, that is, as 
the possible action of a particular image.  
What else can provide the explanation but the manner the necessity of 
actions and reactions governing matter is converted into possible actions? 
Already, mere observation attests that the manifestation of consciousness 
depends on the extent to which action affords choice. The more action is 
automatic the less it is conscious, a good illustration being the unconscious 
nature of our habitual actions. Consciousness serves no purpose at all if 
action is bound to happen necessarily. The observation that consciousness 
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appears or disappears according as action disposes of choices or not can 
help us understand both the virtuality of consciousness in matter and its 
activation. If indeed necessity suppresses or blocks the manifestation of 
consciousness, it is logical to infer that a mechanism capable of suspending 
the necessity of matter is liable to actualize virtual consciousness into the 
conscious perception of images.  
The inference relates consciousness to action rather than being, since it 
associates its manifestation to the liberation of action from necessity. 
Whenever the interaction of images ceases to be necessary, consciousness 
materializes as perception, as “a variable relation between the living body 
and the more or less distant influence of the objects which interest it.”29 We 
can thus deduce conscious perception––not consciousness itself––from the 
type of action connecting images. That necessity precludes consciousness 
establishes conscious perception as an indispensable condition of any action 
implicating choice. In thus inferring conscious perception from images 
interacting in a particular way, Bergson is perfectly consistent with his idea 
that perception stems from things rather than being the projection of a 
subject.  
Placing perception in the things themselves reveals the true role of the 
brain, which is not to generate representation, but to convert necessity into 
possible action, thereby actualizing conscious perception. Bergson 
establishes this role by contrasting the brain with the reflex function of the 
spinal cord. The difference between the two is not that the brain produces 
representations, but that the external stimulus, unlike the immediate, 
involuntary reactions of the spinal cord, takes a detour via the encephalon 
before reaching the spinal cord and provoking a motor reaction. Short of 
generating representation, what else can the transit through the brain entail 
but a delay between reception and execution, which delays allow voluntary 
reaction? The primary role of the brain is thus “to delay” communication 
and make sure that “the peripheral excitation gets into relation with this or 
that motor mechanism, chosen and no longer prescribed.”30 Each time 
reaction is delayed, necessity is transformed into possible action. The 
Bergsonian interpretation moves the role of the brain from deterministic to 
the more positive function of instrument of freedom. 
The delay between action and reaction is how time is inserted into the 
automatism of matter or, which is the same thing, how a breach is 
introduced into necessity and an ontological support is provided for 
conscious perception. While what is automatic shuts off consciousness, what 
delays automatism creates a temporal gap that affords choice, and so 
converts images into possible actions. The larger the temporal gap is, the 
more extended is the field of possible action so that “perception is master of 
space in the exact measure in which action is master of time.” 31 
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Owing to the selective nature of perception, the delay concerns only a 
small part of the universal interaction of all images, the part received by the 
senses and transmitted to the brain.  As a matter of fact, sensory receptors by 
which light, sound, odor, taste, etc., are captured are selectively sensitive to 
the environment. For instance, the human eye, which is only sensitive to 
vibrations of certain frequency, cannot detect radiation that is outside the 
visible region of the spectrum. This selective nature of the senses enables the 
living body to detect the objects that it needs in the environment and avoid 
those that are detrimental. The unselected part, which is the greater part, is 
not delayed: it passes through and hence remains unconscious.  
At this stage, there seems to be a disjunction between the images and 
the living body. On one side, we have stimulus captured by the senses and 
transmitted to the brain; on the other, we have external images. How are 
these images connected with the living body? In the traditional approach, 
the living body was assumed to connect with external objects thanks to their 
subjective duplicates. The latter guide its reactions: hence the traditional 
characterization of perception as preliminary knowledge. Since Bergson 
removes the subjective copy of things, how do the living body’s reactions 
adjust to external images?   
The answer is provided by the second function of the brain (other than 
delaying), which is to coordinate the motor ability of the body with sensory 
stimuli. Bergson’s famous parallel of the brain with a “telephone exchange” 
means that, in addition to receiving messages from outside, it sends them to 
selected motor mechanisms. Obviously, the process co-ordinates external 
stimuli with motor responses but does not fully explain why the responses 
allow choice. The full explanation appears when we note that, by the time 
the stimuli reach the motor tracks, they are transformed into “nascent 
actions.” Because a multitude of motor routes are open to the same stimulus 
at the same time, it is bound to “dissipate itself in innumerable motor 
reactions which are merely nascent.”32  
Nascent actions are motor sketches, actions prefigured but not executed. 
As such, they are felt as invitation to act. In the words of Bergson, they are 
“movements begun, but not executed, the indication of a more or less useful 
decision, but not that constraint which excludes choice.”33 The connection of 
external stimuli with motor abilities in such a way that they are transformed 
into nascent actions instead of imparting automatic reactions is the very 
basis of the spontaneity of the living body. To the extent that motor sketches 
are given as internal affections, they operate as solicitations to act by 
selecting from an array of possible responses. Clearly, this type of 
spontaneity does not necessarily implicate self-consciousness; it is simply a 
motor spontaneity that is half way from mechanical response and deliberate 
decision. The latter presupposes and further extends spontaneous behavior 
so that, as a higher activity emerging from a lower motor spontaneity, 
deliberate decision supports Bergson’s position that pure perception does 
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not require a self-conscious subject. The spontaneity of the living body 
resulting from the internal feeling induced by nascent actions is enough to 
account for the activities associated with perception. At the stage of 
perception, “consciousness appears as a feeling…the feeling of 
spontaneity.”34 What makes nascent actions conscious in the form of feeling 
is that, as is the case with external images, they are suspended actions, and 
so actualized consciousness.  
To assess properly the role of nascent actions, a quick contrast between 
Bergson and what is known as the sensorimotor theory of perception is 
instructive. The sensorimotor account, as developed for instance by Alva 
Noë and J. Kevin O’Regan, agrees on many important points with the 
Bergsonian theory. Thus, like Bergson, the theory rejects the idea that 
perception takes place in the perceiver and maintains that the brain is 
necessary but not sufficient to account for perception. Emphasizing the 
practical dimension of perception in agreement with Bergson, Noë and 
O’Regan write, “visual experience is not something that happens in 
individuals. It is something they do.”35 Moreover, this practical function 
stems from “a set of rules of interdependence between stimulation and 
movement,” the very one from which Bergson derives the spontaneity of the 
living body.36 Accordingly, the adaptation of the living body to the 
environment is not effected through the cerebral replica of external objects, 
but through the synchronization between reception and reaction. The 
synchronization makes the mental duplication of objects superfluous so that 
perception occurs outside the perceiver. As an illustration, Noë and O’Regan 
compare the living body’s adaptation to the environment to a missile 
tracking an airplane thanks to its ability to modify its behaviors in response 
to changes in received information.  
Noë and O’Regan concede that the tracking system of the missile, unlike 
the living body, does not perceive. Where lies the difference between the 
two systems? To raise such a question is to acknowledge that the 
sensorimotor account needs an additional element to explain perception. 
For, even though we have coordination between reception and movement in 
both cases, in the missile the coordination results in automatism, which 
excludes conscious perception. That is why the two authors end up by 
presupposing conscious perception instead of deducing it from the 
sensorimotor account. They say that to be responsive to and aware of the 
environment, the living body must, in addition to the coordination between 
reception and movement, “integrate its coupling behavior with its broader 
capacities for thought and rationally guided action.”37 Instead of backing up 
perception, which is, after all, a primitive activity that precedes all other 
activities, with higher intellectual faculties, Noë and O’Regan should have 
inquired into the reason why the tracking missile is not consciously aware. 
In so doing, they would have come to the realization that, although there is 
coordination in both cases, in the case of the living body the coordination is 
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such that it only induces nascent actions, which allow latitude of choice and 
with it conscious perception. In addition to coordinating stimulation with 
motor response, the brain inserts indetermination so that the response, 
instead of being automatic, is given as possible action. Needless to say, the 
sensorimotor account of perception misses the fact that, once the theory of 
the brain as an organ of representation is laid to rest, the inherence of 
consciousness in matter turns into a logical precondition. As soon as the 
inherence is admitted, it becomes easy to explain how the brain actualizes 
what is but dormant in matter.  
 
The Mechanism of Selection 
Noted that the coordination between incoming information and motility 
through nascent actions constitutes the living body as a sensorimotor unit, 
there remains the question of the precise mechanism by which virtual 
perception is converted into actual or conscious perception. For Bergson, the 
problem is to comprehend how the source of the stimulus that the body 
selects or delays stands out, becomes visible. Unfortunately, many 
commentators of Bergson attribute the conversion to conscious perception to 
some kind of action on the part of the living body. According to Leonard 
Lawlor, for instance, perception occurs when the light emanating from 
objects is reflected by the spontaneity of the body instead of being refracted. 
The reflection draws “a virtual image” so that “perception is a mirage of 
reflected light.”38 Though Bergson does characterize perception by the terms 
“impeded refraction,” “total reflection,” “effect of mirage,” the truth is that 
perception is neither reflection, nor mirage.39 The terms are used 
analogically to explain the appearance of perception as reflection or mirage; 
they do not portray what perception is. The proof that it is about appearance 
in the sense of make-believe is provided by the fact that Bergson speaks of 
“rays,” which, “instead of passing through those centers [of action], will 
appear to be reflected and thus to indicate the outlines of the object which 
emits them.”40  
The terms “reflection” and “mirage” are used to illustrate why we have 
great difficulty in understanding perception as an objective process that goes 
from objects to the perceiver in contrast to the more apparent reverse 
process of the perceiver illuminating objects. The objective account of 
perception cannot dismiss the belief that the subject illuminates objects any 
more than the scientific knowledge of the size of the sun can alter our 
perception of it as a small disc. Be it noted that the seeming movement from 
the perceiver to the object produces an effect akin to a mirage: unlike 
hallucination, a mirage is really perceived except that it is not perceived 
where the object is. Similarly, a reflected image would not coincide with the 
object, which is exactly why theories of perception cannot avoid 
subjectivism. While perception is an objective interaction between images, it 
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appears to take place inside the perceiver and then to be projected outside. 
As we shall soon see in some detail, the way the living body interacts with 
images is primarily responsible for the appearance of projection: both the 
capture of some of their influences and the delay of reaction create the 
illusion that representation comes out from the body. What is more, the 
intervention of memory in the centered system of perception is bound to 
strengthen the falsehood that perception proceeds from the subject. Let us 
agree, then, that the likening of perception to “an effect of mirage” is 
Bergson speaking, to quote one author, “in the mode of as if’: by preventing 
total refraction, with the consequence that the luminous rays cannot pursue 
their way, the body acts as though it were a reflector.”41 
So rectified, the operation by which Bergson explains both the 
appearance and the true nature of perception is rather simple. While an 
ordinary image acts as a passageway for the modifications emanating from 
all the images, the encounter of the actions of images with the living body, 
which Bergson defines as “zones of indetermination” and equates with a 
“black screen,” presents a different outcome in that some of the actions 
cannot pass unopposed.42 In capturing some of the modifications, the senses 
isolate and channel them without any refraction to the brain where they are 
delayed, divided, and sent to selected motor paths. The purpose of the entire 
process is to prevent vibrations from propagating and producing immediate 
reactions. This ability to prevent refraction and reflection likens the body to 
a black screen. The whole question is to understand that this process is at the 
same time how the images sending the vibrations are made to protrude. 
According to Bergson, when the rays coming from surrounding images meet 
an image that acts as a black screen, and not as a reflector, the outcome is 
that the images shine out. To convert an unperceived image to a perceived 
one, Bergson writes, “it would be necessary, not to throw more light on the 
object, but on the contrary to obscure some of its aspects…so that the 
remainder, instead of being encased in its surroundings as a thing, should 
detach itself from them as a picture.”43   
To correctly understand the operation and its outcome, let us see what 
would happen if the body were to throw more light on the surrounding 
images. It would mean that the body reacts to the rays through refraction 
and/or reflection, the outcome of which is that there is more light instead of 
less. Just as car drivers approaching from opposite directions are dazzled if 
they use high-beam headlights, any reflecting or refracting action of the part 
of the body will add more light to the surrounding images so that no 
particular image is distinguishable. If, however, acting as a black screen the 
body does not add more light to some of the vibrations reaching it, the 
sources from which they emanate detach themselves from all the rest. 
Nothing stands out in the unselected part of reality, due to the dazzling light 
caused by the instantaneous and all-round actions and reactions of images. 
Put otherwise, what the body has not selected remains translucent for lack of 
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a darkening agent. By contrast, in suspending its reactions to some aspects 
of the surrounding images, to wit, in not adding more light, to pursue the 
analogy, the living body cuts and draws them out from the fused and 
indistinct existence of the interactions of all images. The selected aspects 
stick out from their flattened existence owing to the delay of reactions 
which, had they occurred, would leave them immersed in the surroundings. 
The actions and reactions of images in all their sides yield an entangled 
reality in which nothing is distinctly appearing. In delaying its reactions to 
some of these actions, the living body extracts them from the entanglement 
and displays them as its possible actions.  
Now let us translate the physical analogy in psychological terms. 
Instead of acting as a reflector, the living body, we said, delays its reactions 
by channeling the vibrations to which it is selectively receptive through the 
complicated maze of the nervous system. In so doing, it lifts the 
neutralization of consciousness by the automatic actions and reactions of 
images. Because the images sending the vibrations are not reacted to, the 
virtuality of consciousness is actualized and images become conscious 
perceptions. Such a conscious appearance is not consciousness of something, 
but images as consciousness, as possible actions of the living body. To 
simplify, if we take two images, representation remains virtual because the 
action of each image returns as reaction, and so neutralizes representation. 
However, if one image holds back its reactions, the acting image appears: 
the suspension of necessity allows its manifestation as consciousness.  
To illustrate further, let us take the example of sounds, which according 
to science are vibrations. The sound emitted by an object in a room bounces 
off from all the present objects. None of these objects hears because each 
reacts automatically so that the process is restricted to vibrations received 
and returned by all objects. As a result, no sound is distinguishable in the 
room and hearing remains virtual. If, however, we introduce in the room a 
living body, the vibrations are heard, not because the living body transforms 
them subjectively into sound, but because the ears capture the vibrations 
and channel them to the brain so that reaction is withheld. This suspension 
actualizes consciousness, not in the brain, but in the object emitting the 
vibration. This does not mean that the object hears itself for the obvious 
reason that necessity is suspended for the aspects that interest the living 
body and not for the object itself, which remains in the system of matter. The 
selected part is heard by the non-reacting image in the precise sense that it is 
given as its possible action.  
The interruption of determinism cannot be realized by any mechanism 
resorting to action and reaction. In whichever way the mechanism is 
designed, action and reaction cannot but activate determinism instead of 
suspending it. Ruse is what is needed, the very one contrived by the living 
body, which is to delay reaction by sending the actions of images into a 
labyrinth of intricate paths that delays, divides, and distributes them to 
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selected motor connections. Not only does the ruse suspend determinism, 
but it also does it in such a way that the object appears as the possible action 
of the living body.  
 
From Pure to Concrete Perception 
We saw how the living body cuts out its own possible actions in the fluid 
reality of the interactions of images. The operation consists in images 
sticking out from the surroundings and assuming individualized and fixed 
forms. What pure perception explains is the selection process, not the 
distinct and fixed appearance of images. The latter requires the intervention 
of another faculty, namely, memory, which then accounts for the transition 
from pure to concrete perception.  
To begin with, the way perception is explained calls for the involvement 
of memory. As stated previously, all-sided actions and reactions mean that 
the formation of distinct images remains virtual, as it is “neutralized at the 
very moment when it might become actual, by the obligation to continue 
itself and to lose itself in something else.”44 That actions and reactions 
dissolve individuality also entails that constant mobility is the defining 
characteristic of the underlying reality. This perpetual dissolving of 
distinctness indicates that pure perception cannot be more than the “pure 
blinking of phenomena,” their instant appearance and disappearance.45 To 
give consistency and duration to what is selected, a faculty that can contract 
various moments of the movement of material objects is necessary. What 
else could realize this contraction but memory, the very faculty that 
“prolongs the past into the present?”46 Our continuity holds together in the 
same present moments of matter that are successive. The prolongation 
solidifies, so to say, what constantly appears and disappears, which is then 
none other than perception without memory, or, which is the same thing, 
materiality. In thus holding together flicking moments of pure perception, 
memory injects the rhythm of our duration into the perception of matter.  
In light of the practical function of perception, the intervention of 
memory should not come as a surprise. It springs to mind that the 
disengagement of the living body from the rhythm of matter conditions its 
ability to act on matter by freely choosing its reactions. In condensing 
instantaneous moments, the living body obtains distinct and fixed images, 
thereby solidifying the flow of matter in a way appropriate to its actions. In 
addition to adjusting objects to the actions of the living body, the fixation 
imparts more intensity to the characteristics of images. The immediacy of 
actions and reactions posits a very relaxed, loose continuity in matter. It 
amounts to the doing and undoing of phenomena and accounts for their 
flickering appearances. Speaking of the highly diluted intensity of material 
phenomena, Bergson refers to a “very long history.”47 Thus, what in one 
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second we perceive as red light is the history of 400 billions of successive 
vibrations in matter.  
 It follows that the qualitative nature of perception is the product of 
condensation of the extremely diluted continuity of matter. The qualities 
that we perceive do exist in matter but in a very weakened form so that they 
come close to constituting, without ever reaching it, a system of 
homogenous and quantitative vibrations. Qualities are thus not merely 
subjective translations; they are objective aspects of matter that our memory 
condenses, thereby giving them a more intense and defined appearance. We 
must keep in mind that what is immobilized and condensed as picturesque 
and stable does not cease to be vibrating inside itself. The identity and 
stability of the object persists so long as the internal vibrations do not cause 
a noticeable difference.  
 The attribution of qualitatively defined and stable objects to memory’s 
condensation of the selective work of pure perception should not give rise to 
the charge that Bergson reintroduces a distinction between appearance and 
reality. True, there are no distinct objects in matter and the distinctions that 
our perception introduces are artificial, being valid only for the purpose of 
action.  However, the artificiality does not subjectivize the perceived, which 
is of the same nature as the real: it only gives it a form appropriate to the 
actions of the living body. Neither selection nor condensation alters the 
content of what is given and both simply adjust images to the action of the 
living body. It is obvious for selection; it is no less obvious for condensation, 
since what is contracted and appears as an object with distinct qualities is 
the very one exiting objectively but in a more diluted manner.  
To sum up, two temporal facts of memory contribute to the genesis and 
autonomy of the subject. (1) The contraction of the extremely rapid 
succession of matter by a more concentrated duration differentiates subject 
and object. For the theory assimilating perception to an internal copy, the 
distinction between subject and object originates from the projection of the 
duplicate as representation of external objects. As a result, space becomes 
the mark of externality, and hence of the distinction between subject and 
object, the defining character of the former being its inextensibility. As 
analyzed previously, such a solution makes the existence of the external 
world very problematic. Bergson rejects the idea of perception as spatial 
projection; instead, he proposes a temporal approach to the distinction 
between subject and object. In his own words, “questions relating to subject 
and object, to their distinction and their union should be put in terms of time 
rather than space.”48 (2) The conservation of the past generates a historically 
acquired identity that gives the subject precedence over the object. The 
insertion of past memories into pure perception subjectivizes the act of 
perceiving:  beyond being just selection, it acquires a cognitive dimension, 
with the understanding that subjectivity is not the act of projecting internal 
states but of interpreting and enriching the present perception with past 
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experience. The interpretation is how the past spontaneously moves toward 
the present, thereby converting the impersonal nature of pure perception 
into the perception of a subject.   
In thus replacing the dualistic opposition between subject and object 
with differences in durational intensity, Bergson demarcates subject and 
object while at the same time maintaining the objective nature of perception. 
Pure perception represents the level where subject and object coincide, while 
concrete perception provides the higher level where the distinction between 
the two takes place. The classical approach lodges perception in the subject 
and no matter how this perception is said to join the external world, neither 
the existence of an external world nor the objectivity of perception can be 
recovered. The correct approach is to leave perception in the things 
themselves and show how the subject emerges from this primitive union. 
The theory overcomes the difficulties of traditional dualism: instead of 
trying to unite two substances (matter and spirit) defined as irreconcilable, it 
establishes their effective union at the level of pure perception and their 
distinction at the higher level of concrete perception subsequent  to the 
intervention of memory. 
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